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IntroductIon 
The Christian Social Union (CSU) has ruled Bavaria continuously for sixty years. 
The CSU’s domination of the state’s political scene, together with its influence 
on federal policies through its partnership with the CDU in the Bundestag, has 
made the party one of the most effective groups in Europe. This was confirmed 
in the election to Bavaria’s Landtag in October 2018, which the CSU has won once 
again. At the same time, the party is being confronted by other conservative 
groupings, mainly Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), which has a similar pro-
file to the CSU in several aspects. This, combined with the outflow of similarly 
sized groups of voters to the AfD and to the Greens, as well as to Freie Wähler, 
means the CSU is facing a new challenge that involves creating a comprehensive 
political agenda without losing the party’s conservative identity. 
The purpose of this report in to present the place the CSU occupies on the politi-
cal map of Germany and the importance of this grouping for Bavaria. It discusses 
the changes happening both within the CSU and in Bavaria itself and the pos-
sible scenarios for the development of the party and of the state. To study these 
processes, the author has mainly used the methodology of observing political 
developments and analysing documents published by the German government, 
as well as Bavaria’s laws and documents compiled by the CSU. This has been 
complemented by interviews with German experts.
The text is divided into four parts. The first part contains an analysis of the rela-
tions between the CSU and the CDU and of the significance of the two parties’ 
joint parliamentary group, alongside the possible consequences of the group’s 
unity being broken. The second part discusses the main elements of the CSU’s 
political programme and the changes happening within the party itself and 
among its voters, including in the context of the 2018 election to the Landtag. 
The third part presents Bavaria’s foreign policy and the CSU’s impact on how 
it is shaped. The final part discusses the main socio-economic challenges Bavaria 
is currently facing and the CSU’s concepts of how to maintain the present pace 
of the state’s development. 
This report is not intended to present the situation of Bavaria and the CSU 
as a whole, but rather aims to shed light on what the author considers the most 
significant phenomena, processes and trends. 
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MAIn PoIntS
•  In the German federal system, Bavaria plays a special role. It is one of the 
most important states, generating around 20% of Germany’s GDP, and the 
leader of the sixteen constituent federal states in negotiations between the 
states and the federation (for example, regarding federal subsidies in con-
nection with the states’ burden caused by the migration crisis). It is also the 
most active defender of states retaining their competences (such as in the 
fields of education and security), as well as the author of solutions which 
are then accepted by other states or the entire country. The economic clout 
of this state is rooted both in the dynamic growth of its GDP and the lowest 
unemployment figures in Germany for years, as well as Germany’s larg-
est companies being based in Bavaria and their international expansion. 
It is crucial for the state itself, as well as for the whole of Germany, that 
these trends are maintained, for reasons including the boost to the federal 
budget from its tax revenues, and its support for the less developed states 
with financial transfers. 
•  The CSU is the strongest regional party in Germany and the only one with 
its own representation in the Bundestag. The CSU’s position at the federal 
level results from the fact that since 1949 it has had a joint parliamentary 
group with the CDU and that the Christian Democratic bloc composed of 
the CDU and the CSU has consistently received up to 20% of all votes cast 
for Christian Democratic parties in federal elections. The differences be-
tween the CSU and the CDU that exist both in their joint parliamentary 
grouping and in the government coalition sometimes force the CSU into 
playing the role of the opposition in their own government. At present, the 
keenest controversy is being raised by Chancellor Angela Merkel’s migra-
tion policy which the CSU rejects. Despite repeated threats that the CSU 
might separate itself from the CDU, this is unlikely. If this threat is put into 
practice, the resulting situation would be unfavourable mainly for the CSU 
itself. It would result in the creation of a local CDU structure in Bavaria and 
would translate not only into the CSU losing its single majority in the Land-
tag, but also into the CSU’s Bundestag caucus breaking up, which would 
lead to the disintegration of the party, and this is opposed by voters of both 
parties.
•  The Landtag election held in October 2018 has confirmed the dominant 
position of the CSU on the Bavarian political scene. It has also pointed 
to increasing difficulties in forming a one-party government in Bavaria. 
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The party’s worst result since 1949 (37%), combined with the outflow of 
similarly sized groups of voters to the Greens, the AfD and Freie Wähler 
(around 160,000-strong), means the CSU is facing one of its most difficult 
challenges in history. On the one hand, the CSU will try to expand its pro-
file to include climate protection issues. On the other, it will be forced to 
defend its current conservative programme mainly in its rivalry with the 
AfD. As far as Freie Wähler are concerned, due to the fact that they co-form 
the post-election coalition in Bavaria and also due to their regional rather 
than federal nature, they pose a lesser threat to the CSU. In addition, the 
AfD’s entry to Bavaria’s Landtag, the good result scored by Freie Wähler and 
the return of the FDP all have contributed to a fragmentation of the Bavar-
ian political scene. In the medium term, this will prevent the CSU from 
building a majority position.
•  What is at stake in the CSU’s rivalry with the AfD is not only maintaining 
the CSU’s dominant position in Bavaria, but also confirming the CSU’s cur-
rent importance as the most significant party with a conservative profile 
on the German political scene as a whole. The CSU treats all groupings that 
are positioned further right on the political scene as undemocratic and ex-
tremist. The political rapprochement between the CDU and the SPD and the 
Greens (which began in 2005, during Angela Merkel’s first term as chan-
cellor) has resulted in the CSU’s views becoming more sharply defined. The 
party proposes that the so-called guiding culture (Leitkultur) should be 
revived with the intention of fostering a “bourgeois-conservative change” 
in Germany as a whole. The CSU is drawing upon the main elements of its 
traditional political programme: Christian values, the family as the foun-
dation of social life, Bavarian regionalism, limits on immigration, effective 
social care and low taxes, and domestic security.
• The CSU owes its electoral success so far to a conservative profile combined 
with the state’s economic achievements, as well as the ability to adapt its pro-
gramme to changing social trends. Voters see the party as both a guaran-
tor of Bavaria’s economic success and the advocate of the social interests of 
vulnerable social groups. However, the CSU is undergoing a transformation 
which may result in it losing its status as a mass party appealing to all social 
groups, which was confirmed in the 2018 election to the Bavarian Landtag. 
These changes are structural in nature; they result primarily from the aging 
of the population and the inflow into Bavaria of residents from other Ger-
man states. This results for example in the group of Catholic voters shrinking 
(so far, two thirds of Catholics in Bavaria have voted for the CSU) and young 
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voters turning to social media as their primary source of information. This 
process is overlapping with a strong polarisation within German society (in-
cluding Bavaria) regarding its approach to the migration crisis. 
• Bavaria conducts the most active foreign policy of all Germany’s federal 
states. It serves the development of the state’s trading and cultural relations, 
and helps the party wield influence on the federal government’s domestic 
and foreign policy. It also strengthens the sense of identity and distinctive-
ness of both Bavaria and the CSU. As regards foreign policy, the CSU does 
not feel closely bound to its coalition agreement with the federal govern-
ment. This is manifested, among other things, in its maintenance of close re-
lationships with Russian politicians, and in its disputes with the strategies 
developed in the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs with regard to the US. 
Its support for the foreign interests of Bavarian companies and its hosting of 
foreign delegations in Munich translates into the perception of the CSU as 
a party that cares about the interests of its voters on a global level. 
•  Close economic and political relations with Central Europe are typical of 
Bavaria. In its contacts with many countries of the region, Bavaria de facto 
acts as an equal partner. The state has its representative offices abroad and 
maintains intensive inter-governmental contacts. Munich has established 
close relations with Prague, which became possible in 2010 when the years-
long dispute over history and the role of expelled ethnic Germans in bi-
lateral relations ended. This also translates into economic cooperation. In 
2017, aside from Austria, the Czech Republic was Bavaria’s biggest trade 
partner from among the states of Central, Eastern and Southern Europe, 
and its fifth trade partner globally (Poland was ranked eighth). Hungary 
is another of Bavaria’s close partners from this region, with strong politi-
cal links to the CSU. The CSU is trying to capitalise on these links to build 
a counterbalance to the government in Berlin. 
•  In the medium term, Bavaria also faces challenges related to changes in 
the way people work, and adapting to Industry 4.0. This includes chang-
ing business models, enhancing the IT industry and developing start-ups, 
expanding the participation of emerging markets in exports, changes in 
education, and better access to the Internet. Improvement of methods to 
integrate immigrants into the Bavarian labour market is also important. 
Negligence in these areas could have a negative impact on the economy 
of Bavaria and threaten its sustainable growth, generating additional ex-
penses related to social policy. 
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I. The prImacy of munIch over BerlIn 
The dual role of The cSu
The CSU is the only state-level party with federal representation, and its road 
towards federal-level politics led through its success in the state1. From the 
beginning the other groups in the Bundestag needed to build up a political 
position at the federal level, which to a great extent has been subordinated 
to the creation of regional structures and efforts to win support for them 
in successive state elections. The CSU has been present in federal politics 
since the creation after the parliamentary elections in 1949 of its joint par-
liamentary group with the CDU in the Bundestag. The CDU’s coalition with 
the CSU (and the FDP) was essential to the formation of Konrad Adenauer’s 
first cabinet in 1949–1953. The CSU became quite a disciplined part of the 
Christian Democrats’ group (while creating its own state representation 
in the CDU/CSU parliamentary group ), which resulted in the consolidation 
of the close cooperation between them. The consequence was that the CSU 
has participated in all the CDU governments (1949–1969, 1982–1998 and since 
2005). However, no chairman of the CSU has ever been chosen as the Federal 
Chancellor, although twice the CDU/CSU’s choice for that position has fallen 
to a politician from Bavaria – Franz Josef Strauss (see box below) in 1980, 
and Edmund Stoiber in 2002. 
franz Josef Strauss (1915–1988)
1961–1988, the chairman of the CSU, and in 1978–1988 Bavaria’s minister-
president. In Germany considered a figure of key importance in both Ba-
varian and federal politics. He was the most prominent politician in the his-
tory of the CSU and the creator of its power. All of his successors draw upon 
his heritage. In 1953–1969 (excluding the period from 1962 to 1966, which 
followed his resignation caused by him creating the so-called Spiegel affair 
in which he had accused Rudolf Augstein, the founder and editor-in-chief 
of the Der Spiegel weekly, of treason and had caused him to be detained), 
Strauss served as minister for special affairs (the youngest minister in 
Adenauer’s second government), minister for Nuclear Energy, minister of 
Defence and minister of Finance. In the 1980 election to the Bundestag he 
ran as candidate for chancellor nominated by the Christian Democrats; 
1 Local political parties operate in various states (e.g. Brandenburger Vereinigte Bürger-
bewegungen/Freie Wähler, Bürger in Wut, Freie Wähler, Südschleswigscher Wählerver-
band), but they do not participate in federal politics.
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he lost to the incumbent chancellor, Helmut Schmidt. From 1978 to 1988, he 
was prime minister of Bavaria. His run for the office of chancellor and his 
dislike for Helmut Kohl, the leader of the CDU, nearly resulted in the break-
up of the joint parliamentary group in 1976. 
Strauss was viewed as one of the Bundestag’s most skilful orators and his 
debates with Herbert Wehner, the leader of the SPD parliamentary group, 
went down in the history of German parliamentarianism. The tradition 
Strauss initiated to organise party rallies on Ash Wednesday (Politischer 
Aschermittwoch)2 transformed the local events into professionally di-
rected shows that are now frequently copied by other political parties. As 
Bavaria’s prime minister, Strauss pioneered the state’s intensive foreign 
policy (for example by maintaining contacts with the leaders of China and 
the USSR, as well as with Togo and Chile; his mediation in the process of 
granting loans worth 2 billion marks to the East Germany was of particu-
lar importance, as it restored the East Germany’s status as a financially 
credible state). The symbolic visit Strauss paid to Moscow in 1987 has gone 
down in history. The CSU leader flew his light aircraft himself which he 
landed in Moscow despite very harsh weather conditions. Strauss was ac-
companied by Theo Waigel and Edmund Stoiber, who still acts as an in-
termediary between the CSU and Russian politicians including President 
Vladimir Putin.
1. The value of the joint parliamentary group
In the Bundestag, the CSU makes up a joint parliamentary group with the CDU. 
Within this framework, the CSU deputies also make up a state representation 
in the CDU/CSU parliamentary group, which de facto is a party within a party. 
Its chairman is usually one of the CSU’s most influential politicians and a con-
tender for one of the two main functions in the party, either the chairman of the 
CSU or prime minister of Bavaria. Every few years the threat of the CDU and 
CSU separating and becoming independent within the Bundestag arises, but 
due to their mutual interest in maintaining the status quo, this is not a real-
istic prospect. In the 1970s, as fundamental policy differences and personality 
conflicts began to arise, some members of the CSU began to demand that they 
leave the common group in the Bundestag, and also that they should consider 
2 The tradition of organising political rallies on Ash Wednesday dates back to 1919 and to cat-
tle markets’ members of Bavaria’s Agrarian Union used as a forum for discussing current 
political issues.
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running as independents in parliamentary elections in other states3. The CSU 
has also raised some of these objections again more recently, but this has pri-
marily served as a way of ‘raising the stakes’ in coalition negotiations with the 
CDU, and of disciplining the party and getting it to knuckle under to its leader. 
The most serious crisis in relations between the parties occurred in 1976, when 
the Christian Democrats were in opposition. This led to the CSU voting to split 
the group, but after a threat by the CDU’s chairman, Helmut Kohl, that his party 
would be ready to create local structures in Bavaria, the CSU withdrew its deci-
sion after three weeks. 
A split would bring losses to both parties. For the CDU, the lack of the CSU’s 
support would mean less political strength at the federal level and make it more 
difficult to build coalitions; so far the CSU have won between 10% and 20% 
support for the joint Christian Democrat group in parliamentary elections4. 
Moreover, the expectation that the CDU will collaborate with the CSU in the 
Bundestag has also encouraged conservatives from other states to vote for 
the CDU. However, the effects of a split would be more painful for the CSU. 
The creation of two parties would lead to the CDU establishing local struc-
tures in Bavaria, and drain away some of the CSU’s voters in state and federal 
elections. This would make it significantly harder for the CSU to form one-
party governments in Bavaria, and would likely lead to the end (or a signifi-
cant reduction) of its presence in the Bundestag. This would weaken the CSU’s 
influence on federal policy, especially if it refused to participate in CDU-led 
governments, and also reduce its electoral subsidies. The CSU would become 
a primarily regional party, which neither the party’s members nor its voters 
want. In the Bundestag, the state representation in the CDU/CSU parliamen-
tary group would probably disintegrate, some of the Bavarian party activists 
would cross over to the CDU, and the CSU would become marginalised. The CSU 
used to be the third or fourth biggest political force in Bonn (alternating with 
the FDP), the main adversary of the SPD, and a driver of German public debate 
(notably in the Bundestag debates between the SPD chairman Herbert Weh-
ner and Franz Josef Strauss). A CSU standing alone at the federal level would 
be much less influential; the risk of the CDU coming to an agreement with the 
Greens and the FDP without the CSU would rise. The establishment of local 
3 The discrepancy was brought about by what the CSU leadership saw as the overly leftist 
programme of the CDU, as well as the CDU’s support for the normalisation of relations with 
Communist Poland in the 1970s. 
4 In the current Bundestag term, the group has 246 deputies – 46 representing the state’s CSU 
group and 200 from the CDU. 
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structures by the CSU in other states to strengthen its representation in the 
Bundestag would be lengthy, costly and extremely difficult, not only because 
of the existing structures of the CDU, but also in the light of the rise of the AfD.
2. Bavaria first 
The CSU’s participation in federal politics is subordinated to the interests of the 
group in Bavaria, which often makes it serve as a quasi-opposition within its 
government coalition with the CDU. The main lines of dispute between the sister 
parties now concern migration, domestic security and European policy issues. 
In the past, the policies disputed included Germany’s Eastern policy, the attitude 
to the US, and the issue of whether Germany should have nuclear weapons, 
something Franz Josef Strauss did not rule out5. The CSU’s political presence 
in the Bundestag not only allows the realisation of projects which are important 
from the point of view of the Bavarian electorate, but also gives it access to the 
nationwide media and a presence in different constituent bodies at the federal 
level6. This translates to national popularity for individual politicians in Bavaria 
and builds a sense of the party’s strength. It also strengthens their advantage 
over other groups in the Bavarian state parliament, and makes it difficult for 
the opposition to take power in Bavaria. 
The CSU’s most important objective is to maintain its independent rule in Bavaria. 
This objective is also served by initiatives taken at the federal level. Poor results 
in the state elections translate to a weaker political position in Berlin, not only 
within the CDU/CSU in the Bundestag, but also in the Bundesrat and the Federal 
Assembly. Combining two levels of policy – the federal and the state – also gener-
ates problems. Working for Bavaria’s interests at the federal level, promoting the 
CSU’s solutions and engaging in politics in Berlin shows voters how strong and 
important the party is. On the other hand, the Bavarian electorate sometimes 
perceives the party’s overly intense involvement in federal or European politics 
as a departure from the CSU’s regional priorities. Despite this, the CSU usually 
aspires to play a significant role in federal politics, shape the policy of Germany 
as a whole, and implement solutions which affect not only Bavaria, but the entire 
5 P. Gassert, ‘Streiten wie zu Strauß' Zeiten’, Die Zeit, 3 July 2018, https://www.zeit.de/politik/
deutschland/2018-07/cdu-csu-streit-geschichte-franz-josef-strauss/komplettansicht.
6 In the last two terms, policies introduced at the federal level at the initiative of Bavaria have 
included an annual upper limit on the number of refugees accepted into the country (Ober-
grenze), fees for drivers of cars and camping vehicles using the German motorways and 
national roads, and a more favourable entry requirement for the beneficiaries of pensions 
for mothers (Mütterrente).
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country. The most important topics for CSU at the federal level, broadly under-
stood, are domestic security, foreign policy and social policy. 
3. The cSu’s identity: back to the roots?
Since the party was founded in 1945, two concepts for development have clashed 
within it. The first favoured the conservative and Catholic character of the 
party, manifesting itself in the maintenance of close relations with the Cath-
olic Church traditionally dominant in Bavaria (including by reference to the 
Church’s social teaching, participation in events of a religious nature, and the 
introduction of religious education in schools) without corresponding contacts 
with the Protestant churches. The second concept proposed the extension of its 
political offer to moderate voters (especially in the approach to elements of post-
war social reforms including the nationalisation of selected companies and 
agricultural reform) and taking the sensitivities of the Protestant community 
into account. The turning point in the dispute came after its only loss of power 
in Bavaria since 1949, when the SPD won in 1954. This led to changes in the struc-
ture and leadership of the party: the new leader Hanns Seidel ended the Catholic 
activists’ dispute with the Protestants over the emphases in CSU policy, creating 
a more moderate profile for the party. In 1961, Franz Josef Strauss became head 
of the party, and led it for 27 years until his death in 1988. His reign and style 
of government led to the identification of the CSU as the political representation 
of Bavaria. Strauss was and remains a legendary figure on the German political 
scene, and the pillars of his party’s policy as he defined them – conservatism, 
modernisation, regionalism – still stand today.
The CSU presents itself as the only authentic party with a right-wing profile, 
treating groups further to the right of itself as extreme and undemocratic. 
It thus continues the policy of Strauss, whose motto was that “no democratic 
party may arise to the right of the CSU”. The Bavarian group has so far been 
the main party of conservative views represented in the Bundestag. With the 
progressive rapprochement of the CDU’s policy programme to those of the SPD 
and the Greens since 20057, the CSU has become the only force shaping public 
7 One manifestation of this process was the introduction of the minimum wage, the possibil-
ity of having dual citizenship, the professionalisation of the army, rescuing the euro zone, 
and the policy of energy transition. These actions by the Christian Democrats succeeded 
in building them a strong position in the political centre, but also made it increasingly diffi-
cult to distinguish their program from those of the SPD or even the Greens. See A. Ciechano-
wicz, ‘Predictability lost: the German political scene after the elections’, OSW Commentary, 
No. 254, 22 November 2017; https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/commentary_254.pdf.
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debate on the centre-right. However, this status is currently being threatened 
by the Alternative for Germany, which entered the Bundestag in 2017 and has 
appropriated this space, presenting itself as the only party which truly pro-
claims conservative values. 
The process of defending itself against marginalisation and the shift of some of its 
voters to the AfD, as well as opposition to its move away from traditional values 
(as in its migration policy), will force the conservative CSU into defending its iden-
tity more seriously than before. This aim was served by the manifesto published 
at the beginning of 2018 by Alexander Dobrindt, the head of the CSU’s parlia-
mentary group in the Bundestag and one of the leaders of the party’s traditional-
ist wing8. According to Dobrindt, there is a need for a “conservative revolution” 
to respond to the “turn to the left” which has been ongoing in Germany since 1968. 
Dobrindt emphasises that the time of “left-wing ideologies, social-democratic 
statism and Green prohibitions” has passed away, and that “the new Islamism 
threatening the freedom of Europe should not get the opportunity to solidify”. 
The CSU also accuses the German media of bias in the public debate, which, 
according to the Bavarian party, has undergone a “left-wing bent”. The answer 
should be the resurrection of the so-called guiding culture (Leitkultur), which 
should be the indicator of “bourgeois-conservative change” in Germany. 
In this way the CSU is drawing upon the main elements of its traditional politi-
cal programme. These consist of Christian values, the family as the foundation 
of social life, Bavarian regionalism, limits to immigration, effective social care 
and low taxes, and the domestic security which is the traditional watchword 
of the party:
 – Christian values are reflected in maintaining the tradition of hanging 
crosses in schools and court rooms9; opposition to women wearing the 
burqa in public places, disapproval of minors entering into marriage 
8 A. Dobrindt, ‘Wir brauchen eine bürgerlich-konservative Wende’, Die Welt, 4 January 2018, 
https://www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/plus172133774/Warum-wir-nach-den-68ern-
eine-buergerlich-konservative-Wende-brauchen.html.
9 During a meeting on 24 April 2018, Bavaria’s government amended the rules regarding the 
buildings occupied by the Bavarian administration and ordered that, starting from 1 June 
2018, crosses should be hung in all Bavarian public institutions. To justify this, Bavaria’s 
newly appointed prime minister Markus Söder pointed to the significance of the cross 
as “the symbol of Christian-Western cultural identity”. In many Bavarian institutions 
crosses are hung on the walls, but until recently there was no explicit legislation that would 
require this. Schools and court rooms were an exception because since 1983 they have been 
covered by the requirement to hang crosses. 
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and of forced marriages, establishing public holidays only on Christian 
holidays, opposition to the liberalisation of abortion laws (including the 
advertising of abortion clinics) and euthanasia laws, opposition to the 
state increasing its subsidies for in vitro fertilisation treatment for non-
married couples (while approving this form of support if it is granted 
to married couples); opposition to granting equal status to marriages 
and same-sex relationships (while emphasising non-discrimination of 
same-sex relationships)10; 
 – family – considered the foundation of social life, which is reflected in 
financial support granted to families raising children. Forms of this 
support include tax breaks for married couples, increased child ben-
efits, house building subsidies for families paid out for ten years fol-
lowing the birth of a child, and opposition to promoting the so-called 
‘gender ideology’ during school classes;
 – Bavarian regionalism – or attachment to one’s birthplace, to the Hei-
mat understood as a ‘small homeland’ and as the foundation for pat-
riotism which is manifested for example by emphasising the cultural 
importance of the German language and its promotion in the EU, cele-
brating national holidays, attachment to national symbols, the national 
flag and regional costumes. The CSU also understands taking care of the 
equal pace of development of specific parts of Bavaria as falling under 
Bavarian regionalism;
 – integration and limits to immigration  – understood as limiting the 
inflow of immigrants from different cultures. Proposals include the 
requirement that immigrants should renounce citizenship of their 
country of origin. Despite this, it is likely that by 2040 around a third 
of Bavaria’s residents will be of immigrant origin. In 2014, or prior to 
the main wave of the migration crisis, in the Integration Index com-
piled by the Berlin Institute for Population and Development, Bavaria 
was ranked third among all German states as regards the effectiveness 
of integration; the study showed that education of immigrants was one 
10 In 2016, the CSU’s youth organisation adopted a slightly altered version of the passage 
on family values and indicated that “a marriage between woman and man forms a good 
framework for the family”, which does not rule out other forms of partnership. Cf. Grund-
satzprogramm der Jungen Union Bayern, http://www.ju-bayern.de/med/5646-grundsatzpro-
gramm-der-ju-bayern.pdf.
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of the weakest elements, including a high proportion of individuals of 
immigrant origin dropping out of education and failing to pass the sec-
ondary school-leaving exam (in these categories, among all 16 German 
states, Bavaria is ranked eleventh and thirteenth, respectively);
 – effective social care and low taxes – combining slogans about tax re-
lief and a balanced budget with an acceptance of regional regulations 
concerning selected taxes (such as inheritance taxes); lowering taxes 
for top earners and increasing spending on assistance for the elderly;
 – domestic security – support for increasing the competences of state ser-
vices in particular at the state level (in 2018 Bavaria’s Landtag amended 
the law on state police to significantly expand its powers; the new law 
was later copied by other states, for example North Rhine-Westphalia), 
increasing the number of police officers; fighting all forms of extrem-
ism, including left-wing extremism; engaging the Bundeswehr to sup-
port the police in particularly dangerous activities (for example in case 
of the threat of terrorism). 
Domestic security has become the party’s watchword in its policy pursued at the 
federal level and at the same time a touchstone of the CSU’s credibility. Bavaria 
boasts the lowest crime rate compared to other states (Munich is Germany’s 
safest city) and the highest proportion of solved criminal cases.
4. The political offer: tradition and modernisation, 
social policy and heimat
The conservative manifesto combined with the CSU’s traditional priorities, pro-
posals and slogans together make up a political offer intended for a wide range 
of voters. Tradition is being linked to modern regionalism, and modernisation 
– to a more broadly understood idea of security and an ambitious social policy. 
For the CSU, the synergy of tradition and modernity has laid the foundation 
of success for both the party and the state. The CSU’s slogan of ‘Laptop und Leder-
hosen’ symbolises Bavaria’s transition from a state of agriculture to one of indus-
try, where high technologies are being developed. The evolution of the party’s 
position has primarily concerned the economy, but has also sometimes involved 
philosophical issues, including emphasising the prohibition of discrimination 
on grounds of sexual orientation in its manifesto. One important influence on the 
programme’s evolution was the fact that for years the traditional Bavarian-born 
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Catholic electorate (two thirds of Catholics in Bavaria vote for the CSU) has been 
shrinking, while residents from other states have been arriving, and young peo-
ple have been turning to social media as their primary source of information. 
The CSU presents itself as the guarantor of Bavaria’s economic success and as an 
advocate for the economic interests of vulnerable social groups. For them, social 
policy is the second pillar of the German economy next to the free market; the 
intention is to offer equal opportunities and protect the weakest, especially 
taking into account the changes to the state’s demography and labour market, 
as well as the challenges of digitisation. The use of slogans about modernisation 
and supporting entrepreneurship with social funding has in the past prevented 
a mass exodus of voters to the SPD and won broad support for economic changes. 
The CSU’s social sensitivity has also played an important role in its discussions 
with the CDU. In 2003, Edmund Stoiber (the then leader of the party) got the 
CDU to give up their plans to limit Germany’s social policy.
At present the CSU’s priorities in social policy, in addition to broad support for 
families, include tackling long-term unemployment, as well as providing equal 
access to public services for people with disabilities. Moreover, its social policy 
combines slogans about tax relief and a balanced budget with an acceptance 
of regional regulations concerning selected taxes (such as inheritance taxes). 
One of the main elements of the CSU’s social policy is to expand the availability 
of housing and halt the rise in rents, which is a growing problem for large Ger-
man cities, including Munich. 
Bavarian regionalism is still an important element of the CSU’s identity as a mass 
party. This should be understood as a two-dimensional concept: as a commit-
ment to ‘small homelands’, local patriotism and making references, for exam-
ple, in documents compiled by the party to the traditional regions of Bavaria 
(Franconia, Swabia and Old Bavaria); as well as the pursuit of balanced devel-
opment for the whole of the state. The idea of the Heimat, which is the motto 
of Bavarian patriotism and social solidarity, allows the CSU to act as the voice 
of the entire state, for residents of both the country and the cities. Most Bavar-
ians live in rural areas (7.1 million, compared to 5.6 million in the cities), and 
this is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future (over the next two decades 
the urban population is projected to increase by 9%, and by 3% in rural areas11). 
11 Regionalisierte Bevölkerungsvorausberechnung für Bayern bis 2037, Statistical Office of the Free 
State of Bavaria, https://www.statistik.bayern.de/mam/statistik/gebiet_bevoelkerung/
demographischer_wandel/demographische_profile/09162.pdf, p. 19.
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The importance of regionalism in the CSU’s policy was emphasised by the exten-
sion in 2014 of the state Ministry of Finance’s competence to work towards 
equalising the standard of living in all regions of Bavaria12. This includes the 
availability of medical services, communications, reducing unemployment 
in rural areas, and providing educational opportunities outside Bavaria’s major 
urban centres. The aims of this policy were laid out in the strategic programme 
presented in 2014 (Heimat Bayern 2020)13. After the CSU took control of the Fed-
eral Ministry of Internal Affairs in 2018, the name was changed (as happened 
to the state Ministry of Finance) to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Construc-
tion and Heimat. In Bavaria, regionalism is also considered as a marketing tool: 
the brand ‘Made in Heimat’ with which local products are marked is meant 
to signify the highest quality and show support for local producers. 
12 The ministry’s full name is Bayerisches Staatsministerium der Finanzen, für Landesent-
wicklung und Heimat.
13 Regierungserklärung ‘Heimat Bayern 2020’, The State Ministry of Finance, Development and 
the Homeland, 27 November 2014, https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s
&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwi_7NDz9Z_hAhUOp4sKHQDUCh
oQFjABegQIAhAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.bayern.de%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%
2F2014%2F11%2FRegierungserkl%25C3%25A4rung-%25E2%2580%259EHeimat-Bayern-
2020%25E2%2580%259C.pdf&usg=AOvVaw2f8C9BewKGkil6eUiv6Nwy.
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II. The cSu followIng The 2018 elecTIon In BavarIa 
In the election to Bavaria’s Landtag on 14 October 2018 the CSU came out as the 
winner having garnered 37.2% of the votes. This was a drop in its election result 
by as much as 10.4 percentage points compared with 201314. Bavaria’s prime 
minister Markus Söder (CSU) formed a coalition with Freie Wähler, a grouping 
whose ideological profile resembles that of the CSU that served as an alternative 
for voters who were dissatisfied with the achievements of the Christian Demo-
crats. Freie Wähler’s political programme focuses mainly on regional politics; 
the grouping does not compete with the CSU at the federal level (unlike the AfD). 
The two groupings combined received 112 out of the 205 seats, which guarantees 
a stable majority for the government. 
chart 1. Distribution of seats in Bavaria’s Landtag
Balance of power in Bavaria’s 205-seat Landtag
CSU − 85 seats
SPD − 22 seats Freie Wähler (FW) − 27 seats
Greens − 38 seats
FDP − 11 seats
AfD − 22 seats
Source: Infratest dimap for ARD
14 The Greens came in second with 17.5% of the votes (+8.9 p.p.). Freie Wähler, a group-
ing of independent candidates, garnered 11.6% of the votes cast by Bavarians (+2.6 p.p.). 
The AfD’s result (10.2%, fourth place) was below the expectations of both its members and 
its voters. The SPD garnered a mere 9.7% of the votes and recorded major losses (-10.9 p.p.). 
One of the reasons behind the CSU’s unimpressive electoral result was the strong compe-
tition for votes cast by conservative voters, which Freie Wähler and the AfD also wished 
to win. What was unfavourable for the Bavarian Christian Democrats, who are members 
of the federal government, were the disputes within the ruling coalition at the federal level 
and the conflict between CSU leaders. Similarly, the electoral campaign’s focus on the con-
sequences of the migration crisis did not bring the expected surge in votes.
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chart 2. The flow of voters from/to the CSU to/from other parties
CSU
SPD
Freie Wähler (FW)
Greens
FDP
non-voters
AfD
other
  100 000
-160 000
-170 000
-40 000
  270 000
-160 000
   0
Source: Infratest dimap for ARD
In the 2018 coalition agreement, the two parties pledged to: maintain a bal-
anced budget, develop road infrastructure (€400 million by 2020), employ 
500 new police officers annually, build new crèches and kindergartens, 
employ an additional 5,000 teachers, and grant additional support to families. 
The promise to build 10,000 new council flats by 2025 was an important ele-
ment of the CSU’s electoral campaign. Alongside this, the two parties intend 
to establish a state agency for energy and climate protection, and to post-
pone the decision to expand Munich airport, which was proposed by Freie 
Wähler. A new ministry for Digitisation was created. The new government 
will be more active in environmental protection: for example it committed 
itself to include climate protection issues in Bavaria’s constitution and to set 
state climate protection targets (less than two tons of CO2 per capita annually 
by 2050). This is to enable the party to recover the portion of its electorate 
that crossed over to the Greens (170,000 votes) before local elections to be held 
in Bavaria in 202015. 
The increase in the significance of the Greens, the entry of the AfD to the Land-
tag and the return of the FDP, as well as the good result achieved by Freie 
Wähler all form new challenges the CSU is now facing in state politics. This 
concerns the implementation of one of the party’s priorities, i.e. the creation 
of a one-party government, alongside the adoption of an appropriate electoral 
strategy to make the party more attractive to both conservative voters (besides 
15 K. Frymark, ‘A continuity coalition in Bavaria’, OSW Analyses, 7 November 2018, https://
www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2018-11-07/a-continuity-coalition-bavaria.
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the CSU, at present three more parties are soliciting their votes: the AfD, Freie 
Wähler and partly the FDP) and the supporters of the Greens. The changes 
announced following the Landtag election involved injecting new blood into 
party structures, increasing the proportion of women as party members, 
and expanding the political programme to include environmental protection 
issues. One of the priorities defined by Markus Söder, the CSU’s chairman since 
January 2019, will be to reform German federalism and to abandon centralist 
trends. The power shift in the CSU comes as a result of Horst Seehofer’s position 
gradually dwindling. Party members intended to hold him accountable for the 
unprofessional campaign ahead of the Bundestag election and Bavaria’s Land-
tag election, and for exacerbating the dispute with the CDU over migration 
policy. In March 2018, he was forced to resign as Bavaria’s prime minister and 
was replaced by Söder, who until then had been Bavaria’s minister of Finance. 
Next, in November 2018, Seehofer decided not to re-run for the function of the 
CSU’s chairman. This signalled victory for the group led by Söder in the party’s 
internal rivalry. The group received support, for example, from former chair-
man Stoiber, who continued to be a highly influential figure, and from the 
CSU’s youth organisation. 
1. Structural changes to the Bavarian electorate
Economic growth and low unemployment, together with the commitment 
to combine traditional values with understanding for the needs of moderni-
sation, as well as the emphasis on security issues, has been quite an effective 
recipe for the CSU’s electoral success. However, the party is experiencing prob-
lems in connection with the changes taking place in all the mass parties in Ger-
many, which have translated into falling support16. The scale of the changes 
is reflected in the electoral results for the two major parties in Bavaria, the CSU 
and the SPD. In 1974, these two combined won 92.3% of the votes, but in 2008 
they only managed 62.3%. In addition, the appearance of another conservative 
party in Bavaria (in the form of the AfD) and the high support for the Greens 
have threatened the CSU’s dominance in Bavaria and are accelerating its loss 
of voters. 
These changes to the Bavarian electorate are structural in nature. They are asso-
ciated with an aging population and changes in electoral habits. Also, the num-
ber of people without a permanent political affiliation has increased, and some 
16 A. Ciechanowicz, Predictability lost…, op. cit. 
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voters are choosing to vote in order to ‘spite’ the mainstream parties, in an effort 
to express their opposition to the status quo. This all means that the party’s abil-
ity to mobilise new voters is weaker than before. Thanks to the influx of a large 
number of residents from other states, there has been a steady decrease in the 
proportion of Catholic voters, which is of particular importance to the CSU (two 
thirds of Bavarian Catholics vote for the party17). The CSU’s effectiveness has 
also been impacted by personality issues between the party’s leaders, as well 
as the way in which the electoral programmes have been presented. All these 
factors have contributed to a drop in support for the CSU in Bavaria, but it still 
remains higher than support for the Christian Democrats in other federal states 
and at the federal level. 
Another challenge for the CSU, as for the other traditional parties, lies in the 
new ways of communication via social media, which allow groupings that know 
how to make better use on-line marketing tools to reach out to voters more effec-
tively18. In this respect, an analysis of the election campaigns conducted online 
before the parliamentary elections in 2017 highlighted a significant advantage 
for the CSU’s main rivals in Bavaria – the AfD19. 
The opposition parties in Bavaria do not have much experience in the field 
of real governance, and are fragmented 20. One of the problems for the opposi-
tion – especially the SPD and the Greens – is reaching out to voters outside the 
cities. Although these parties have scored good election results in Munich and 
Nuremberg (where the SPD governs), they have been unable to mobilise voters 
from rural areas. Attempts to adapt to the expectations of the more conserva-
tive voters living outside the large centres expose these parties to charges 
of imitating the CSU’s policies, and in fact have counterproductive effects. 
The success of the Greens has marked a change in this trend. However, it is too 
early to assess the durability of the increase in their popularity in Bavaria. 
17 G. Hopp, M. Sebaldt, B. Zeitler, Die CSU: Strukturwandel, Modernisierung und Herausforder-
ungen einer Volkspartei, Wiesbaden 2010, pp. 33–40.
18 The AfD has 400,000 followers on Facebook, while the CSU has 210,000, third in Germany 
after the Left Party (die Linke).
19 ‘Der missglückte Online-Wahlkampf’, Handelsblatt, 28 September 2017, http://www.han-
delsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/bundestagswahl/alle-schlagzeilen/cdu-und-csu-der-
missglueckte-online-wahlkampf/20384590.html.
20 With the exception of the FDP, none of the current opposition parties have formed a gov-
ernment in Bavaria since 1957. Only once since World War II did the SPD create a majority 
coalition and have a prime minister in Bavaria (1954-7). In 1946-7 and 1950-4 the state was 
ruled by a grand coalition under the leadership of the CSU. 
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In the Landtag election, this increase resulted from the party consistent focus 
on environmental protection issues and social affairs, as well as from not being 
tainted by participation in the government coalition at the federal level, and 
also from the positively assessed changes made to the party’s executive body 
following the 2017 election to the Bundestag. Other drivers of voter mobilisa-
tion included rallies organised in Bavarian cities against the CSU’s planned 
amendment to the law on the state’s police, which was considered too strict. 
The SPD’s dullness has been another important factor. Statistics on the flow 
of voters indicate that 210,000 individuals who had formerly voted for Social 
Democrats now voted for the Greens.
2. The afd: an alternative to the cSu
Although the AfD came in fourth in the state elections, it poses the biggest chal-
lenge to the CSU both in Bavaria and at the federal level, because their election 
programmes are similar in profile. By voting for the AfD, the majority of voters 
want to express their protest (85%) against the erosion of German culture, the 
excessive social changes caused by immigration, and the excessive influence 
of Islam21. So far, the AfD has achieved its success by tactics including exploiting 
the ongoing disputes in Germany on the understanding of the concepts of the 
nation, history, and culture of the state, which hitherto in Bavaria had mainly 
been the CSU’s domain. The CSU’s rivalry with other parties of a similar profile 
in Bavaria (for example with the Bavaria Party that lost most of its voters to the 
CSU in 1959) had previously been local in nature, and for a party firmly embed-
ded in federal policy, it was not too much of a challenge to suborn them. This 
time, however, the CSU’s rival is active at the federal level as well; the AfD has 
been pointing out the errors made by the Bavarian Christian Democrats, and 
has shown the way for a departure from the conservative roots and the legacy 
of Franz Josef Strauss22. In the face of this criticism, the CSU’s closeness to the 
CDU is proving to be a handicap; the latter party has been accused even more 
strongly by the AfD of betraying traditional Christian Democratic values, pri-
marily with regard to migration policy, as well as security issues both domes-
tically and on the European stage. The rivalry with the AfD, then, means that 
the CSU needs to make more radical emphases in its manifesto. We may even 
21 A survey of AfD voters on the biggest threats that Germany must deal with: Bundestagswahl 
2017. Umfragen zur AfD, ARD, 24 September 2017, https://wahl.tagesschau.de/wahlen/2017-
09-24-BT-DE/charts/umfrage-afd/chart_208795.shtml.
22 B. Neff, ‘Die verkaufte Seele von Franz Josef Strauss’, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 6 August 2018, https://
www.nzz.ch/international/die-verkaufte-seele-von-franz-josef-strauss-ld.1409073.
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expect it to take over some of the AfD’s demands. Symptoms of this process can 
already be seen in the hardening of the CSU’s attitude in its dispute with the 
CDU on migration policy23. 
23 K. Frymark, A. Kwiatkowska-Drożdż, ‘Serious clash between CDU and CSU on migration 
policy. European implications’, OSW Analyses, 20 June 2018; https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/
publikacje/analyses/2018-06-20/serious-clash-between-cdu-and-csu-migration-policy-
european.
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III. The cSu and BavarIa’S foreIgn polIcy
The states have limited competence in foreign policy and the main powers 
in this area are vested in federal administrative bodies (Article 32 of the Ger-
man Constitution). The activity of the states can be divided into cooperation 
between the governments of the federal states and the federation (especially 
in the Bundesrat24), and independent activities (which sometimes even com-
pete with politics at the federal level). The former mainly involves co-shaping 
Germany’s European policy. In the Bundesrat, the states are involved in the 
legislative process of adapting legal acts adopted at the EU level to domestic law 
(Article 23 of the German Constitution). The consent of the Bundesrat is also 
required to amend the European treaties. The representation of the interests 
of the individual states abroad is mainly related to regional and cross-border 
cooperation, support for exporters, cooperation in the fields of science, educa-
tion and culture. This policy also involves establishing representative offices 
in the EU (all German states have such representative offices) and in the most 
important states globally that are Germany’s partners, e.g. in the USA (it hosts 
around 20 offices – some states have more than one office). 
The most active states in foreign policy are the three most populous and wealthy 
ones: Bavaria, neighbouring Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia 
which borders the Benelux countries. For Baden-Württemberg and North 
Rhine-Westphalia, their ambitions to pursue foreign policy are primarily based 
on their intention to take care of economic interests and maintain cultural 
contacts. In addition, Bonn in North Rhine-Westphalia hosts more than 20 UN 
agencies, which facilitates international contacts. 
1. The importance of Bavaria’s foreign policy for the cSu
For Bavaria, foreign policy is important in two aspects. It serves to represent 
the state on the international stage and at the same time is subordinated to the 
political interests of the CSU, which are often contrary to the policy of the CDU 
or the government as a whole. For the CSU, Bavaria’s foreign activities are an 
instrument for achieving the following purposes in particular: 
24 This refers to the legislative powers of the Bundesrat. Cf. T. Fischer, Bundesländer und Bun-
desrat, p. 192–202, in: S. Schmidt, G. Hellmann, R. Wolf, Handbuch zur deutschen Außenpoli-
tik, Wiesbaden 2007. 
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a) influencing the federal government 
Using the instruments of state foreign policy, the CSU attempts to influence 
the federal government’s domestic and foreign policy, by frequently presenting 
a different attitude than the one adopted by the Foreign Ministry and the Chan-
cellor’s Office. This was the case with the sanctions imposed on Russia25 and 
the rapprochement with Austria which in 2015 and 2016 had intended to seal 
the Balkan migration route. Both initiatives met with resistance on the part 
of the CSU26 and the party increased its lobbying activities in favour of solutions 
that were beneficial for Bavaria. These included the easing of sanctions against 
Russia and close cooperation with the Balkan states and Austria to limit illegal 
migration to Germany. 
b) emphasising the CSU’s separate political identity
Using foreign policy measures (for example, inviting leaders who challenge 
Berlin’s policy, e.g. Viktor Orbán and Sebastian Kurz, to party meetings, and 
organising foreign visits of party representatives, including to Russia), the CSU 
emphasises the differences between itself and the CDU in terms of foreign pol-
icy priorities, thereby strengthening its separate identity and building a sense 
of distinctiveness among its members and voters. In Bavaria’s foreign policy, 
the CSU does not feel closely bound by the provisions of the coalition agree-
ment, which allows it to highlight its party interests. Since the times of Franz 
Josef Strauss, each subsequent CSU chairman and Bavarian prime minister has 
attempted to build his foreign policy activity by distancing himself, at least 
in part, from the chancellor’s position and decisions.
c) supporting the pursuit of Bavaria’s supra-regional interests and global ambitions
Because of its size and economic potential, Bavaria presents itself as a supra-
regional player whose interests extend beyond its immediate neighbourhood 
and beyond Europe. By offering support to entrepreneurs (e.g. the participa-
tion of managers in delegations of representatives of the Bavarian government) 
25 K. Frymark, A. Ciechanowicz, ‘Dreaming of normalisation. Germany vs. Russia’, OSW Commentary, 
No. 255, 7 November 2016, https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/commentary_225.pdf.
26 M. Szpala, K. Frymark, ‘Patching the Western Balkan migration route’, OSW Analyses, 2 March 
2016, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2016-03-02/patching-western-bal-
kan-migration-route and A. Ciechanowicz, ‘Russia is driving a wedge into Germany’, OSW 
Analyses, 26 November 2014, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2014-11-26/
russia-driving-a-wedge-germany. 
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and receiving foreign delegations in Munich, Bavarian politicians build confi-
dence among the electorate in Bavaria’s global interests and opportunities. This 
translates into voters perceiving the CSU as a party that is taking care of their 
interests on the global scale.
d) strengthening its own identity by pursuing regional politics
Relations with the countries of Central Europe are of particular importance for 
Bavaria’s foreign policy. Emphasis is placed on the state’s proximity to the coun-
tries of the region (mainly the Czech Republic, Austria and Hungary), which 
makes Bavaria particularly suited to act as the guardian of Sudeten Germans27. 
For Bavaria, the sense of regionalism extending beyond the borders of Germany 
is a form of building its identity and separate status from other states and the 
federal government. Bavaria’s unique nature results from its strong economic 
and political ties with Central Europe, primarily understood as the Danube area 
that stretches to the Balkans and the Black Sea. 
2. main assumptions and directions of Bavaria’s foreign policy
2.1. Central Europe 
Due to the region’s geographical proximity and historical ties, Bavaria develops 
close relations with the states of Central Europe. This mainly concerns Austria, 
the Czech Republic and Hungary. In these relations, Bavaria acts as a de facto 
equal partner for the region’s states. 
2.1.1.  Austria 
Austria is Bavaria’s major economic partner in Central Europe. In 2017, its 
exports to Austria accounted for 7% of Bavaria’s exports as a whole (€15.1 bil-
lion), and its imports – 9% (€16.3 billion). Since Austria’s entry to the EU in 1995, 
a revival of Bavarian-Austrian cooperation has been recorded and numerous 
projects have been implemented using EU funding. Over the last decade, the 
main problem involved the CSU’s proposed introduction of a toll on German 
motorways for passenger car drivers (so-called Pkw-Maut). Vienna opposed 
the new regulation, seeing it as a sign of discrimination against foreigners and 
27 After World War II most ethnic Germans from the Czech lands settled in Bavaria and formed 
a strong group of CSU voters. The CSU treats Sudeten Germans as one of Bavaria’s regional 
pillars (alongside the population of Franconia, Swabia and Old Bavaria). They are of great 
importance for the CSU’s policy.
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a violation of EU law, as well as a potential burden on its own road infrastruc-
ture. The Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) led by Sebastian Kurz coming to power 
in October 2017 gave new impetus to the bilateral cooperation. Kurz’s views, 
mainly on migration policy, are convergent with Bavaria’s restrictive policy. 
Back in November 2016, Kurz (still holding the office of Austria’s foreign minis-
ter) took part in the CSU’s party convention, during which he demanded that the 
policy towards the migrants coming to the EU should be made more restrictive. 
In order to weaken the German Chancellor’s position and build a counterbal-
ance for her policy at home, the CSU used the generation gap between Merkel 
and Kurz and the deep political dispute over migration policy, alongside certain 
personality issues between the two politicians28. Berlin sees Austria’s chancel-
lor as the main proponent of the plan to seal the Balkan migration route; he 
indeed achieved this prior to the signing of the EU-Turkey agreement negotiated 
by Chancellor Merkel. Kurz repeatedly expressed harsh criticism of Merkel’s 
migration policy, including in the German media, which was viewed as med-
dling in Germany’s internal affairs. In 2018, first intergovernmental consulta-
tions between Bavaria and Austria were held29. 
2.1.2. The Czech Republic
Bavaria’s relations with the Czech Republic are among the most intensive politi-
cally, although until 2010 they had mainly been shaped by disputes over history. 
The state of Bavarian-Czech relations used to be determined by the memory 
of the Beneš decrees and their consequences, as well as the support Bavaria 
had granted to ethnic Germans who had resettled in Germany from the former 
Czechoslovakia30. The CSU acts as their guardian, including at the federal level. 
The Bavarians demanded that the Beneš decrees be annulled, hoping that prop-
erty claims made by Germans who had lived in Czechoslovakia would be recog-
nised. Prague, for its part, rejected any such plan. By acting as the advocate for 
the expelled, the CSU intended to win their votes. The Czech Republic, for its 
part, criticised Bavaria’s close ties to groups of the expelled and organisations 
28 K. Frymark, A. Kwiatkowska-Drożdż, ‘Serious clash between CDU and CSU on migration policy. 
European implications’, OSW Analyses, 20 June 2018, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/
analyses/2018-06-20/serious-clash-between-cdu-and-csu-migration-policy-european-0.
29 Ch. Deutschländer, Söder und Kurz im Merkur-Interview: ‘Ziehen zu 100 Prozent an einem 
Strang’, Merkur, 17 February 2018, https://www.merkur.de/politik/markus-soeder-und-
sebastian-kurz-im-interview-mit-muenchner-merkur-9621767.html.
30 Pursuant to decrees issued in 1945 by the government of the Czechoslovak Republic in exile, 
the so-called Beneš decrees, after World War II around 3 million Sudeten Germans were 
resettled and dispossessed. Most of them settled in Bavaria.
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that represented them. This resulted in numerous conflicts, including the CSU’s 
objection to the Czech Republic entering the EU, which was voiced in 2002, for 
example by Edmund Stoiber, the then CSU chairman and Christian Democratic 
candidate for chancellor. 
An improvement was achieved as a result of efforts by Czech diplomats on the 
one hand and German diplomats acting at the federal level on the other. The Ger-
man-Czech declaration signed in 1997 brought about a normalisation of bilateral 
relations and called for focusing on common interests and reducing the impact 
of history on politics to a minimum. 
The development of nuclear energy has been another wedge driven between 
Munich and Prague over the years. The plan to expand the nuclear power plant 
in Temelín has become a symbol of the conflict, as in the dispute present in Aus-
trian-Czech relations. The conflict was resolved after some time and the so-
called Melk Protocol was signed in December 2000. Pursuant to the document, 
the Czech Republic is required to communicate detailed information regarding 
the situation in the power plant31. In 2010, Bavaria’s prime minister Horst See-
hofer paid his first visit to Prague, which was a breakthrough in Czech-Bavarian 
relations and resulted in bilateral cooperation becoming closer. In December 
2014, Bavaria opened a representative office in Prague. During their meeting 
in 2015, Sudeten Germans (acting as the Sudeten German Homeland Association 
that forms a component of the Federation of Expellees) amended the statutes 
of their association by striking out their property restitution claims and their 
demand regarding the right to return to the Czech Republic. This policy is also 
supported by Bavaria’s new prime minister Markus Söder. 
Bavaria is the Czech Republic’s most important trade partner of all the Ger-
man states and accounts for a quarter of Germany’s total exports to the Czech 
Republic32. In 2017, the Czech Republic was Bavaria’s second biggest trade part-
ner (after Austria) of all countries of Central, Eastern and Southern Europe. 
In 2017, the value of Bavaria’s imports from the Czech Republic was €14.4 billion, 
31 M. Gniazdowski (ed.), Projekty jądrowe w Europie Środkowej i Południowo-Wschodniej. Stan 
i perspektywy, ‘Raport OSW’, June 2015, https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/raport-
osw/2015-06-23/projekty-jadrowe-w-europie-srodkowej-i-poludniowo-wschodniej.
32 Delegation der Bayerischen Wirtschaft in der Tschechischen Republik (Bavaria’s eco-
nomic representative office in the Czech Republic), https://www.bavariaworldwide.de/
tschechien/ueber-tschechien/wirtschaftsbeziehungen/.
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and its exports to the Czech Republic – €6.5 billion33. For comparison, the value 
of Bavaria’s exports to Russia is around €3 billion annually. More than 300 
Bavarian companies have subsidies in the Czech Republic. Cross-border coop-
eration34 and cooperation in the field of culture are positive. 
2.1.3. Hungary
For a long time, Bavaria has had the closest political relations with Hungary 
among the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. After 1956, Bavaria took 
in around 80,000 Hungarian refugees, more than 13,000 of whom still live 
there35. Bavaria is Hungary’s most important economic partner of all the Ger-
man states. It accounts for around a third of German investments in Hungary 
and is the biggest importer of Hungarian goods from among all the German 
states. Bavarian companies mainly invest in the automotive sector which is the 
driving force of the Hungarian economy (e.g. the Audi manufacturing plant 
in Győr). As regards political cooperation, Fidesz has been the CSU’s partner 
since the 1990s and Viktor Orbán’s government is cooperating with the Bavarian 
government in a number of fields including security (training police officers), 
environmental protection, and digitisation. Regular meetings are held between 
the Bavarian governmental committee and representatives of Hungary36. Fidesz 
uses its cooperation with the CSU to strengthen its position in the European 
People’s Party in which the German Christian Democrats CDU/CSU are of key 
importance. It has repeatedly served as a ‘protective umbrella’ for Fidesz in its 
disputes on the EU forum37. 
Orbán was a frequent guest at the CSU’s party meetings (for example in 2014–2018). 
In 2001, he received the Franz Josef Strauss award from the Hanns Seidel 
Foundation which is associated with the CSU. The relations became closer 
during the migration crisis, when the Orbán supported the CSU’s demands, 
33 Statistical Office of the Free State of Bavaria, https://www.statistikdaten.bayern.de/gen-
esis/online?operation=previous&levelindex=2&levelid=1547041931549&step=2.
34 In 1990, the Bavarian-Czech protocol on mutual cooperation was signed and a group coordi-
nating cross-border cooperation was established. 
35 T. Vitzthum, ‘Die unheimliche Beziehung der CSU zu Orbáns Ungarn’, Die Welt, 23 September 
2015, https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article146735062/Die-unheimliche-Bezie-
hung-der-CSU-zu-Orbans-Ungarn.html.
36 Europaministerin Dr. Beate Merk und Außenminister Péter Szijjártó zu Meinungsaustausch 
in Budapest zusammengetroffen, 6 October 2016, http://www.bayern.de/europaministerin-
dr-beate-merk-und-aussenminister-peter-szijjarto-zu-meinungsaustausch-in-budapest-
zusammengetroffen-merk-wir-bleiben-mit-ungarn-selbstverstaendlich-im-gespraech/.
37 A. Sadecki, ‘Bavaria: Orbán’s window onto Germany’, OSW Analyses, 10 January 2018, https://
www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2018-01-10/bavaria-orbans-window-germany.
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for example on limiting migration to the EU, and opposed Chancellor Mer-
kel’s migration policy. The CSU used Orbán’s criticism of Merkel’s migration 
policy at the EU forum to strengthen its position within the German Christian 
Democratic groups and to cause a shift in the chancellor’s policy. The German 
media interpreted the CSU’s support for Orbán as transferring the intra-Ger-
man dispute over migration to the EU forum in order to strengthen Merkel’s 
opponents in Europe38. Other divergences between Merkel on the one hand 
and Orbán and the CSU on the other include their attitude towards Russia, 
including the possible lifting of European sanctions against Moscow39. In 2017, 
Bavaria exported goods worth €3.7 billion to Hungary, and its imports from 
Hungary totalled €9.1 billion. 
2.2. The EU
For the CSU, the membership of its MEPs in the European People’s Party is an 
important element of its European policy. Manfred Weber, the deputy chairman 
of the CSU, has been the EPP’s Leader in the European Parliament since 2014. He 
is one of the favourites to be appointed President of the European Commission. 
Another important element of the CSU’s European policy and one that has 
a strong regional and cross-border aspect is Bavaria’s participation in the EU’s 
macro-regional strategies. From the beginning, Bavaria has been strongly 
involved in the creation of the EU Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR) and 
Bavarian companies are among the most active entities implementing this strat-
egy40. Under the strategy, Munich is mainly co-forming projects in the fields 
of security (for example the fight against organised crime and cybercrime) 
and environmental protection. Bavaria is also involved in the creation of the 
EU Strategy for the Alpine Region (EUSALP) which the EU adopted in 2016 
on Bavaria’s initiative. The initiative’s priorities include several goals promoted 
by Munich: economic growth and innovation, mobility, and on the environment 
and energy. In 2017, Bavaria held the presidency of EUSALP. 
38 R. Alexander, Die Getriebenen, München 2017, p. 17. 
39 A. Sadecki, ‘Wizyta prezydenta Władimira Putina na Węgrzech’, Analizy OSW, 6 Febru-
ary 2017, https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2017-02-06/wizyta-prezydenta-
wladimira-putina-na-wegrzech.
40 Cf. M. Gniazdowski T. Strážay, The EU Strategy for the Danube Region. The implications for 
Poland and the Visegrad Group, ‘OSW Studies’, 31 July 2011, https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/
default/files/prace_37_1.pdf.
32
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
4/
20
19
At present, the most important assumptions of the CSU’s European policy41 
include:
 – support for the possibility to amend EU treaties or (if there is not the 
consent of all member states) to allow selected partners to tighten their 
cooperation by building a coalition of interested states; 
 – strengthening subsidiarity principle by limiting the powers of the EU 
and transferring them to the national level; 
 – reducing bureaucracy (in 2007–2014 Edmund Stoiber, former CSU 
chairman, served as the head of the EU task force to limit bureaucracy); 
 – promoting the use of the German language as the EU’s third working 
language (alongside English and French);
 – strengthening national parliaments to prevent nation-states losing con-
trol of the process of implementing changes in the EU: the CSU is in fa-
vour of both granting national parliaments the right to legislative initia-
tive, and of more effective oversight of legislation that is being adopted;
 – opposing any forms of a transfer and social union; the CSU is in favour of 
a strict reform policy (for example in Greece); Peter Gauweiler, a promi-
nent CSU politician and one of the harshest critics of the euro (due to 
divergent views within the Christian Democratic group as regards Eu-
ropean affairs in 2015 he resigned his parliamentary seat), referred five 
decisions of the European Central Bank to the Federal Constitutional 
Court in Karlsruhe; due to the economic importance of the United King-
dom for Bavaria, the CSU supports the efforts to achieve a Brexit deal 
that would preserve the status quo to the greatest degree possible; 
 – the reform of the asylum system to include the division of refugees into 
groups based on the quota system (the CSU allows one exception from 
41 For Germany, including for individual German states, this policy primarily has an inter-
nal dimension and is mainly formulated in strategic documents regarding domestic policy. 
The main assumptions regarding the vision of the EU are contained in the resolution passed 
by the CSU’s executive body on 30 January 2017 entitled “Für ein bürgerliches Europa”, arti-
cles on the CSU’s political programme authored by Horst Seehofer and published by FAZ, 
articles by Peter Gauweiler, as well as in the 2014 Landtag report from the activity of the 
government in Munich in European politics.
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this rule that covers countries that have special achievements for the EU’s 
common migration policy, for example in the field of the protection of the 
EU’s external borders); the introduction of an annual limit to the num-
ber of refugees taken in (Obergrenze); the CSU demands that migration 
centres (so-called hotspots) should be created in Africa, that deportation 
procedures should be more efficient, that cooperation with African states 
should be developed and that standards of taking in asylum seekers and 
their stay in respective EU host countries should be unified;
 – more intensive cooperation between the services responsible for secu-
rity in the EU (including the retention of data exchange) and maintain-
ing random inspections in the Schengen Area; according to the CSU, 
the countries that form the Schengen Area but which fail to meet the 
requirements should be temporarily excluded from it;
 – strengthening EU-level cooperation in the field of defence, maintaining 
the USA’s status as the guarantor of Europe’s security; 
 – maintaining the present shape of the EU’s common agricultural policy 
due to the fact that Bavarian farmers (more than 130,000 individuals) 
are Germany’s main beneficiaries of this policy, and maintaining the 
EU’s budgetary spending earmarked for cohesion policy at the present 
high level (in 2007–2013 Bavaria received €880 million);
 – opposing Turkey’s accession to the EU (and the plan to abolish the visa regime 
for Turkish citizens) alongside a sceptical stance on the possible enlarge-
ment of the EU to include other states, including from the Western Balkans.
2.3. Russia 
The CSU views Russia as one of the most important global partners with which 
it is necessary to seek agreement (including in security issues) and whose inter-
ests need to be taken into account. At the same time, the CSU is in favour of the 
strategy of waiting until the end of Vladimir Putin’s presidency and hoping 
for a reset of Russia’s relations with the West once it is over42. The CSU intends 
to act as the ‘promoter of bridges’ connecting the West and Russia. It is in favour 
42 See. A. Kwiatkowska-Drożdż, Germany on Russia. Yes to links, no to rapprochement, ‘OSW Point 
of View’, 3 March 2014, https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/pw_39_germany_on_
russia_net_0.pdf.
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of a gradual lifting of sanctions against Russia provided that Russia meets the 
requirements defined in the Minsk deal43. Bavaria’s prime ministers pay regu-
lar visits to Russia because they see this as an opportunity not only to pursue 
economic interests, but also to exert influence on Berlin’s decisions on Moscow 
and to confirm Bavaria’s supra-regional foreign policy ambitions. 
The special status of these relations primarily results from the potential of the 
Bavarian economy and its major share in German-Russian trade. Although the 
value of Bavaria’s exports to Russia is relatively insignificant (in 2017 it stood 
at €3 billion annually – three times lower than its exports to the Czech Republic; 
in 2017 the value of Bavaria’s imports from Russia stood at €4 billion), Bavaria 
is Russia’s most important trade partner of all the German states. Around 25% 
of German investments in Russia come from Bavaria. The state generates 15% 
of German-Russian trade44. The Russian side receives representatives of Bavaria 
in line with the protocol reserved for prime ministers of states (meetings with 
President Putin, including in his residence near Moscow). Aside from close and 
regular economic contacts, Bavaria and Russia develop their relations in the 
fields of education, science and culture45. 
2.4. China
China is Bavaria’s most important trade partner in Asia46. Iin 2017 Bavaria’s 
exports to China rose by 7.1% and were worth €16 billion, its imports increased 
by 6.5% and stood at €15.4 billion47. The dynamic development of Bavaria’s 
43 The CSU’s political programme ahead of the Bundestag elections, Der Bayernplan. Klar für 
unser Land, 25 July 2017, https://www.csu.de/common/download/Beschluss_Bayernplan.pdf. 
44 Bayerisch-russische Wirtschaftsbeziehungen und aktuelle Entwicklungen in der russischen 
Wirtschaft, 23 August 2016, https://www.bavariaworldwide.de/fileadmin/user_upload/aus-
land_asien_russland/bilder/2016-08-23_bericht_wirtschaftsbeziehungen_bayern_russ-
land.pdf.
45 M. Ehm, Brücken bauen, ‘Bayernkurier’, 5 February 2016, https://www.bayernkurier.de/
inland/10260-bruecken-bauen/. In 2017, Bavaria signed a memorandum on strengthening 
the cooperation in the field of culture; in March 2017 Bavaria’s prime minister Horst See-
hofer paid a visit to Moscow, and in 2016 Bavaria’s minister of Economic Affairs Franz Josef 
Pschierer travelled to Russia with a delegation of Bavarian industry representatives. 
46 Asian states are Munich’s second (after the EU) trade partner globally; they account for 
17.4% of Bavaria’s exports and 17.5% of its imports.
47 Data after: Bavaria’s State Ministry of the Economy, Development and Energy, Der Außen-
handel Bayerns 2017, June 2018, https://export-app.de/uploads/Der_Aussenhandel_Bay-
erns_2017.pdf and The Statistical Office of the Free State of Bavaria https://www.statistik-
daten.bayern.de/genesis/online?operation=previous&levelindex=2&levelid=154704193154
9&step=2.
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economic relations with China results from the activity of numerous Bavarian 
companies (including production companies) in the Chinese market (around 
2,000 businesses) and many years of Bavaria’s political cooperation with both 
China as a whole and with specific Chinese states. Franz Josef Strauss was 
the first West German politician to meet with Mao Zedong, which triggered 
intensive cooperation at the regional level. Bavaria signed partnership agree-
ments with two Chinese states: with Shandong in 1987 (in 1897–1914 a portion 
of this state had been a component of a Germany colony) and with Guangdong 
in 2004. Bavaria has representative offices in both states. In May 2017, dur-
ing his visit to China, Horst Seehofer announced that another representative 
office would be opened. Prime ministers of Bavaria pay regular visits to China 
(most recently in 2017) and the leaders of China have visited Bavaria (in 2011). 
Cooperation in the higher education sector is of particular importance to both 
partners. More than 160 academic partnerships have been launched and around 
4,000 Chinese academics study in Bavaria, which makes them the largest group 
of non-EU foreign students. 
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Iv. BavarIa’S maIn developmenT challengeS 
and The ouTlook
Bavaria is the largest, richest and fastest growing federal state in Germany. 
In terms of population (13 million) it is the second largest federal state in Ger-
many. Even in 1950, the country’s southernmost state was still a typical agricul-
tural region; at that time a third of all workers were employed in the agrarian 
sector, although at present the sector employs only about 4% of the workforce. 
Bavaria’s gross domestic product in 2017 amounted to €594 billion, bigger than 
that of Poland. Since the crisis and recession of 2008 Bavaria’s GDP has risen 
by 15%, and has shown the fastest rate of growth in Germany. In the quarter 
century since German reunification, Bavaria’s GDP increased by 56%. Bavaria’s 
per capita GDP (€45,810 in 2017) is second only to two Länder-cities, Hamburg 
and Bremen. The Bavarian economy represents 18% of the German economy. 
8 of the 30 companies listed on the German DAX index have their headquar-
ters in Bavaria48. The municipality with the highest average salary in Germany 
is located in Bavaria (Ingolstadt, €4635 gross in 2017). Bavaria is also the second 
largest exporter of Germany’s states (goods worth €192 billion were exported 
from Bavaria in 2017). For years it has also boasted the country’s lowest unem-
ployment (2.7% in December 2018). 
The foundations of Bavaria’s thriving economy consist above all of a strong auto-
motive industry, the internationalisation of its businesses, and the state’s good 
demographic situation, which is linked to migration from other federal states. 
The automotive industry in Bavaria employs about half of the people working 
in this sector in Germany, around 400,000 people in more than 1100 companies. 
Industry sales in 2017 amounted to €109 billion, and 25% of the cars produced 
in Germany came from Bavaria. Companies such as BMW, Audi, Siemens and 
MAN have their headquarters in the state. Bavaria’s most important industrial 
sectors, in addition to the automotive industry, are the pharmaceutical indus-
try, technology, and optical electronics. Tourism is also important, generating 
annual revenues of around €24 billion (2016).
Bavaria is making good use of its present development opportunities. How-
ever, in the next couple of years the state itself and the CSU will face chal-
lenges related to changes in the way people work and in adapting to Industry 
48 The largest joint stock companies in terms of capitalisation and trading index. See M. Dollinger, 
München – Die Hauptstadt des Dax, Merkur, 3 June 2016,  https://www.merkur.de/wirtschaft/
prosiebensat1-steigt-erste-boersenliga-auf-muenchen-hauptstadt-dax-6182866.html.
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4.0. In Germany, this concept involves building large production plants capable 
of autonomically coordinating their joint production processes. This is intended 
to help German companies achieve a dominant position in the smart devices 
and driverless cars market, city mobility systems, comprehensive systems for 
generating energy from renewable sources, and in improving energy efficiency. 
This requires a radical change to the business models applied by German pro-
ducers, greater digital literacy and guaranteed access to cutting-edge IT infra-
structure and the necessary data49. 
1. an assessment of Bavaria’s competences 
In 2015, the strategic consulting company McKinsey prepared a list of areas 
that are of key importance for Bavaria’s development to 2025. The list indicates 
that the state is at risk of losing its leading position as an innovation leader 
in Germany, which will make it difficult for it to maintain its sustainable devel-
opment in the future50. Bavaria’s strong points include: its resistance to crises 
(during the recession in 2009 Bavaria’s GDP declined by a mere 4%); the large 
number of patent applications (second only to Baden-Württemberg); the high 
quality of education (especially in the field of mathematics and the natural 
sciences), as well as the high quality and availability of healthcare. However, 
Bavaria has less impressive achievements in categories such as social stratifica-
tion, the number of start-ups51, the availability of LTE Internet52 and broadband 
Internet (Bavaria is lagging behind Sweden, Norway and Finland – countries 
which Munich considers to be models of development) and the ability to inte-
grate immigrants; making university education available to individuals coming 
from families without an academic background (in Bavaria it is more difficult 
for individuals whose parents have no university-level education to graduate 
from a university than in many other German federal states including Hesse, 
Lower Saxony and North Rhine-Westphalia). 
49 K. Popławski, R. Bajczuk, Industry 4.0. Germany’s new industrial policy, ‘OSW Report’, March 
2018, https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/Report_Industry%204.0_net.pdf.
50 See Bayern 2025, McKinsey, March 2015, the report commissioned by Bavaria’s government 
offered a detailed analysis of Bavaria’s preparedness for competition in an innovation-based 
economy, both with other German states and with states Bavaria considers model states.
51 Berlin is Germany’s most attractive city for start-ups. Aside from Hamburg, it has the big-
gest share in profits earned by these companies and the highest investment level; Rund-
funk Berlin-Brandenburg, Berliner Startups sind die umsatzstärksten in Deutschland, 25 April 
2018, https://www.inforadio.de/dossier/2018/wir-muessen-reden---projekt-2018/unser-
programmiertes-leben/startups-vergleich-umsatz-berlin-hamburg-muenchen.html.
52 In 2014, 88% of the urban population had access to mobile Internet, whereas in German 
city-states (Berlin, Hamburg and Bremen) this proportion was 100%.
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Most of Bavaria’s deficiencies identified in the report limit the inflow of invest-
ments. They also pose a threat to sustainable economic development and may 
trigger increased social spending. According to McKinsey’s report, the main 
challenges the Bavarian economy faces include53: 
 – changing business models – the switch from traditional production 
(which accounts for a major portion of Bavaria’s economy) to cutting-
edge technologies and start-ups; supporting innovation at traditional 
production-based companies (e.g. Siemens, Audi and BMW);
 – enhancing the venture capital sector – mid- and long-term investments 
in private companies at the early stages of their development, which 
bear a high risk of investment failure. In 2012, the share of IT sector in-
vestments of this kind per inhabitant calculated for Bavaria was around 
€4 (the German average is €3), compared to €47 in the US; 
 – expanding the participation of emerging markets in Bavaria’s exports 
– in 2013 their share was 5.3% (the German average is 5.4%); it is 20.1% 
in the US; 
 – changes in education – forecasts indicate that the demand for ‘creative’ 
employees will increase by 16% by 2035, whereas the demand for la-
bourers will decrease by 27%. 
53 Data taken from: Bayern 2025, op. cit. pp. 37-38. 
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chart 3. Bavaria’s exports by product groups 2016
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2. development strategies
Bavaria’s government has thus far responded to the challenges identified in the 
report by developing three strategies: the digital strategy (Zukunftsstrategie 
Bayern Digital adopted in 2015 and supplemented in 2017 by another package 
– Masterplan Bayern Digital II), the strategy of the sustainable development 
of rural and urban areas (Heimat Bayern 2020, adopted in 2014) and the Alpine 
strategy (Zukunftsstrategie für den bayerischen Alpenraum Lebens-, Natur- und 
Wirtschaftsraum mit Zukunft, adopted in 2016). 
The purpose of these strategies is to improve Bavaria’s competitiveness 
by boosting its IT potential to cover the whole of the state (instead of only 
the main urban, industrial and university centres). As regards investments 
(totalling €5.5 billion by 2022), emphasis has been placed on the development 
of modern jobs, for example in the field of artificial intelligence research, 
3D printing, 5G telecommunication systems, driverless cars and cyber 
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security54. Balanced regional development is intended to prevent the depop-
ulation of rural areas and unemployment, and to ensure access to high qual-
ity services such as those offered in big cities55. The Alpine region develop-
ment plan, in turn, is intended to improve environmental protection in the 
Alps and to help Bavaria maintain its status as the main travel destination 
for tourists visiting Germany (in 2016 more than 35 million people visited 
Bavaria; it is the most popular tourist destination of all the German states)56. 
In his April 2018 speech regarding Bavaria’s plans for the next two years, 
the state’s prime minister Markus Söder did not announce any reform plan 
as regards Bavaria’s most important industry – the automotive sector. He failed 
to announce what many experts expected, i.e. support for this sector’s transfor-
mation, for example by offering preferential solutions for driverless and elec-
tric cars. Bavaria does not intend to change its education models. To meet the 
increasing demand for skilled workers, Bavaria adopted a programme intended 
to boost the number of residents active in the labour market. However, due 
to the current absence of unemployment in Bavaria (2.7% in December 2018), 
the pool of potential new employees in the state is insufficient to meet demand 
from employers. Similarly, there is no concept for the integration of immi-
grants beyond those announced by Bavaria’s prime minister: language classes 
and classes on German society and the principles of democracy. Finally, the 
state is not making any efforts to expand its activities to include new emerging 
markets. 
3. outlook 
Both the present model of Bavaria’s development and the CSU’s domination 
on its political scene are changing. Both Bavaria and Germany as a whole 
will have to face new challenges related to the transformation and digitisa-
tion of industry, which may undermine the state’s present economic model. 
In the medium term, Bavaria also faces challenges related to changes in the way 
people work and in adapting to Industry 4.0. This includes changing business 
models, enhancing the IT industry and developing start-ups, expanding the 
54 Masterplan Bayern Digital II, Bavaria’s State Ministry of the Economy, Development and 
Energy, 30 May 2017, http://www.bayern.de/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/17-05-30-masterplan-
bayern-digital_massnahmen_anlage-mrv_final.pdf. 
55 Regierungserklärung ‘Heimat Bayern 2020’, op.cit.
56 Tourismus, Bavaria’s State Ministry of the Economy, Development and Energy, 19 April 2018, 
https://www.stmwi.bayern.de/tourismus/.
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participation of emerging markets in exports, changes in education, as well 
as the availability of LTE Internet and the ability to integrate immigrants. Nev-
ertheless, Bavaria remains Germany’s strongest state and has sufficient attrib-
utes to be able to implement large-scale innovative projects that would allow 
it to maintain the present living standards of its residents and its quick pace 
of development. 
Kamil FrymarK
This work includes extracts from the OSW Commentary on Bavaria: K. Fry-
mark, ‘The Free State of Bavaria and its party: the CSU faces an electoral test’, 
OSW Commentary, No. 288, 10 October 2018, https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/
default/files/commentary_288.pdf.
